After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and their allies enacted the most severe sanctions regime ever implemented against any major economy. This paper examines the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy in this case. A mixed-methods secondary-data approach is used, which includes three methods: a chronology of events based on the main sanctions, a comparison of before-and-after data on macroeconomic variables and forecasts in Russia, and a goal-attainment rubric based on Hufbauer et al. (2007). The findings show that the sanctions exacted costs and affected finance, technology, and energy trades, but the level of resilience of the Russian economy was unexpectedly high, and the political goal to change its course has not been accomplished. Sanctions are thus a means of attrition and signalling, rather than a coercive measure, and their success relies on enforcement and time.
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