Tribunalisation of justice, enacted via the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 that introduced Articles 323A and 323B, can be considered one of the most important structural changes in the delivery of justice in India. Envisioned as a way to alleviate congestion of dockets and achieve speedy and specialised adjudication, tribunals have at the same time sparked a constant constitutional debate about their consistency with judicial review and the doctrine of separation of powers that are regarded as elements of the basic structure of the constitution. This paper analyses the constitutional validity of tribunalisation based on the evolution of the relevant jurisprudence from the case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India to the subsequent series of cases Union of India v. R. Gandhi, Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India leading up to the recent decision of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The paper asserts that although the Supreme Court has always held that the constitutionality of setting up tribunals as a complement to High Courts and not as a substitute for High Courts, the frequent executive efforts to exercise control over the appointments and tenure of the tribunals demonstrate an inherent contradiction between efficiency and judicial independence. The paper concludes with a discussion on the National Tribunals Commission.