The paper surveys the evolution of international and Indian nuclear liability law, emphasizing how legal frameworks address the dual promise and peril of nuclear power. It outlines early global efforts—beginning with expert concerns over catastrophic accidents—to create special liability regimes beyond ordinary tort law. Key international instruments are summarized, notably the Paris Convention, which imposes strict, exclusive liability on operators and sets minimum financial security requirements, including a EUR 700 million baseline and options for reduced amounts for lower risk situations.  The Brussels Supplementary Convention is described as a complementary mechanism that provides additional tiers of public financial support to protect victims when operator funds are insufficient. The paper also contrasts these with broader conventions like the Vienna Convention and the global aspirations of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation, highlighting regional versus universal approaches. Turning to India, the study discusses the domestic Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLND Act) as the nation’s framework for strict, no fault operator liability and for structuring compensation in nuclear incidents. It notes India’s liability caps for operators and the central government’s role in bridging gaps up to international thresholds, as outlined in official guidance.