The very nature of accounting accruals gives managers a great deal of discretion in determining the earnings a company reports in any given period because of information asymmetry between managers and owners. Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. In such a scenario, some corporate mechanisms are required to ensure the protection of investors’ rights and, therefore, corporate governance arises as a set of constraints to reduce the array of agency costs originated by the nexus of contracts in the company. The corporate governance practices examined in the study relates to audit committee characteristics, ownership pattern and capital structure. For investigating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the practice of earnings management, the study used panel data (random effects) regression models for both the univariate and multivariate regression analysis. In this paper researcher analysis only multivariate regression analysis on the basis of audit committee characteristics, ownership pattern and capital structure.